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As John Jeremiah Sullivan remarks in his introduction to String Theory, a 
collection of David Foster Wallace’s essays on tennis, tennis “may be [Wallace’s] most 
consistent theme at the surface level.” As once an elite junior professional himself, 
Wallace reflects on and writes from his own involvement in the sport, with the 
conditioning, strategy, and body-mind training that goes into it. In other essays of String 
Theory, Wallace reaches beyond his personal playing experience, observes professional 
tennis players with their incredible grace, and creates his own tennis playing students in 
Infinite Jest. Throughout these fictional and nonfictional accounts, he conceptualizes 
what such eminent athleticism entails. This paper will show that celebrated athleticism in 
Wallace’s work exhibits an embodimental métis, or an acute, crafty body-mind 
knowledge of its movement through space. Beyond only characterizing athletic 
movement, however, this paper argues that the same concept of métis extends to people 
with disabilities, including characters with disabilities in Infinite Jest. The same 
hyperawareness of corporeality, versatile methods of adjusting to oppositional contexts, 
 v 
and extraordinary complexity are shared by both groups. Using rhetorical scholarship on 
métis and disability theories of embodiment and social representation, this paper will 
draw parallels between the moving body-minds of athletic and disabled bodies and trace 
the implications of this analogy for Wallace’s work and disability studies.      
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Emotional Motion: Introduction to Wallace’s Tennis Writing 
Across his writings on tennis, David Foster Wallace finds order on the court in 
that which “the great tennis player knows” —the counterintuitive dictum to “[l]earn to do 
nothing, with your whole head and body (Infinite Jest 158). Wallace demonstrates how, 
in sports, cognition and affect are necessarily embodied, athletic exercises generated in 
concurrence with physical movement and non-rational thought. “Doing nothing” is a 
learned practice of the integrated body-mind, and the integrated body-mind learning to do 
nothing is the key to athletic triumph. Instead of the sport being significant beyond its 
own parameters, existing only as a distracting game, an isolated microcosm of reality, or 
a masculine hobby, it is something cerebral and embodied in itself. By neither using 
sports as metaphor nor his participation in sports as an object on which to write, Wallace 
in his tennis essay collection, String Theory, writes experiences of athletic bodies, body-
minds in motion, that think and exist only within and through the athletic condition and 
bodily techniques they have developed therein. Like disability studies’ heightened 
awareness of embodiment and the entanglement of the physical, emotional, and 
intellectual, works attuned to the intricacies of athletic conditioning and the rhythms and 
repetitions of muscle memory underscore the notion of the body as a material and mental 
ordering principle and identity. This is not to reinscribe false boundary lines between the 
body, the mind, and the emotions and argue that the body is the preexisting container for 
or ultimate originary basis of self and identity; that is, this is not a dualistic conception of 
mind and body. Rather, Wallace’s writing on athleticism demonstrates what I will argue 
is métis, a rhetorical concept defined by rhetoricians as clever corporeal and cognitive 
knowledge in action. 
 2 
This idea of métis carries through much of Wallace’s portrayal of tennis in his 
1996 novel, Infinite Jest, in both the bodily and mental conditioning of junior competitive 
tennis players at the Enfield Tennis Academy (ETA) as well as the corporeal 
choreography of these players during their matches. With grace and geometric precision, 
the students of ETA are athletic body-minds in motion being carefully conditioned to 
coordinate their minds’ and bodies’ timing. This proper coordination and attunement to 
their body-minds’ perfectly-timed movements is what allows players to achieve tennis 
mastery and the highest rankings. Yet métis is not applied exclusively to athletic bodies 
in the novel, as a number of characters with mental and physical disabilities exemplify a 
similarly clever, embodied knowledge of their sociopolitical situation and navigate their 
circumstances accordingly. Instead of focusing only on the affective embodiment of 
athletes or the sport of tennis as constituted by emotional motion, Wallace extends his 
application of métis to non-athletic, and even stigmatized, disabled bodies to expose the 
likenesses between them, specifically their consciously embodied knowledge and modes 
of navigation.  
Understanding athletic and disability métis as qualitatively analogous reveals the 
resemblances between what is taken as the supposedly enhanced bodily abilities of 
athletes in motion and the supposedly lacking abilities of people with disabilities. 
Wallace presents both athletic and disabled bodies as involving métis without privileging 
one form of métis over the other. In doing so, he makes explicit the always-present, but 
usually implicit, fact that all bodies in motion, athletic and disabled alike, are in constant 
fashioning and negotiation with their resources, configurations, and environments. Thus, 
the purportedly extreme able-bodiedness of professional tennis stars are generated by 
continuous body-mind modifications just as much as body-minds deemed disabled, ill, or 
pathological. This essay collapses the false distinction between the métis of athletic 
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bodies and disabled bodies both to elucidate Wallace’s convoluted characterizations of 
athletics and disability and to demonstrate what the association of athletics and disability 
offers for disability studies scholarship. As I argue, David Foster Wallace’s 
contemplation of tennis athletes’ infinitely majestic play and disabled bodies’ navigation 
of antagonistic environments exhibits how every body-mind in motion in every situation 
can refine métis. In addition, I show how his writing on tennis proves that bodies adored 
for being “super able-bodied” and bodies undervalued for being “less than abled-bodied” 
are fundamentally distinct only in their social representations.  
Cunning Corporeality: Métis in Rhetorical Scholarship  
While this essay applies métis to athletic and disabled bodies, the term is 
originally derived from rhetorical scholarship on clever forms of mental intelligence. 
Given that it concerns flexibility and evasive cunning, though, métis has been notoriously 
difficult to define in decades of rhetorical scholarship on the concept. In 1978, métis drew 
attention as a result of Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant’s examination of the 
idea in their book, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society. After noticing how 
Greek scholarship had neglected the role of métis in Greek thought and mythology, 
Detienne and Vernant sought to show how métis, and the distinct kind of intelligence to 
which the term refers, plays a critical role in Greek thought from its origins. More 
specifically, they define métis as the “complex but very coherent body of intelligent 
behavior which combines flair, wisdom, forethought, [and] subtlety of mind,” and 
recount particular instances in Greek myth wherein métis is operative (2-3). Suturing 
together linguistic studies, the history of technology, and Greek mythology, Detienne and 
Vernant define métis through “archaeological” reconstruction in order to unify its 
multiplicitous manifestations and wide-ranging appearances (3). They have “no simple or 
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easy reply to the questions” of métis’s nature because of its reference to a processual, 
rather than substantive, matter, but they contribute an unprecedented amount of research 
to the location of métis in Greek philosophy and mythology (2). Moreover, in wrestling 
with the slipperiness of the concept and attempting to assemble a vast collection of where 
métis appears in Greek myths, their methodological pursuits are in the spirit of métis 
itself.  
Métis becomes somewhat more concrete as the concept is taken up in further 
research by rhetorician Debra Hawhee. Hawhee responds to Detienne and Vernant’s call 
for further investigation into the idea of métis by taking their abstract idea of the term and 
grounding it in physical embodiments. More specifically, Hawhee’s target in writing 
about métis is to recognize that studies of métis are unavoidably studies of its utilization 
and to argue for the necessarily corporeal nature of métis (even relating athletics and 
rhetoric through the notion of métis). Thus, to this end, Hawhee tracks métis as a “tacit 
style of movement” within certain mythological figures, modes of cognition, and contexts 
that do not readily support such movement or cognition (47). Hawhee uses transductive 
thought to extract features of métis in its mobile, embodied instantiations, such as 
“transformation and disguise,” disguise as identity, performativity, escaping, empowering 
the “weak,” and shape-shifting (57). Then, turning to Aristotle and Plato’s discourses on 
the sophists, who she argues embody métis, Hawhee supplements her idea of métis as 
necessarily corporeal and polymorphous. From Aristotelian philosophy, Hawhee 
highlights the idea of hexis, or the inextricability of bodily state and habits of the body. 
From Socratic philosophy, Hawhee emphasizes the Sophist dialogue in its representation 
of sophists as fishermen or hunters who adapt to their constantly changing environments 
by using masks and bodily distortions. Like the Greek tricksters, the sophists demonstrate 
that métis is concurrently cognitive and corporeal action in particular contexts. For 
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Hawhee, métis, “by its very nature, cannot be apprehended separately from its use” (46). 
“Contrary to logic,” métis “acknowledges a kind of immanence—it emerges as a part of 
particular situations, cunning encounters” (46). While Hawhee’s expansion upon 
Detienne and Vernant’s initial study of métis solidifies its necessary corporeality, she 
similarly explains métis though a few examples rather than an extricable definition. 
Jay Dolmage builds upon Debra Hawhee’s expansion of Detienne and Vernant’s 
study of métis by championing the notion that rhetoric and métis are embodied and then 
exploring different valences of this corporeality. Most prominently, Dolmage focuses on 
the way that nonnormative embodiments and disabilities exemplify rhetorical métis by 
“forging something practical” out of their particular bodies and “changing the world as 
[they] move through it” (149). Dolmage performs a case study of the Greek god 
Hephaestus, who is frequently depicted as having a physical disability, in an effort to 
undermine the assumptions that traditional rhetorical studies take when thinking about 
what type of bodies with which features can practice rhetoric. Throughout his effort to 
“get the story [of Hephaestus and rhetorical history] crooked,” in the spirit of scholars 
looking to disrupt biased understandings of Western history, Dolmage presents the 
complexity of a variety of myths and media concerning Hephaestus (151). These 
accounts show that, not only does Hephaestus’s “disabled” body perform métis, but that 
this métis is rhetorical practice at its best. As Dolmage goes into specific presentations of 
Hephaestus, he argues that Hephaestus’s body allows him a “double and divergent 
orientation” that harbors an “oblique, surprising, [and] lateral form of knowledge and 
position” and a “threatening power”—an exemplary display of métis (159). Dolmage 
interweaves Hephaestus, métis, and rhetoric in a “sort of heuristic” or “interpretive 
machine” of questions pertaining to the representations of Hephaestus’s embodiment and 
corresponding rhetorical prowess to think about the ways in which bodily differences can 
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revolutionize traditional conceptions of rhetorical invention (176, 187). All of this—
Dolmage’s composition of a “double and divergent narrative” of Hephaestus’s double 
and divergent narrative and his “resulting collage” of a chapter—was effectively crafty 
and, again, a style in the spirit of métis itself (168-169). However, Dolmage’s emphasis 
of the disabled body as “the” body of rhetoric and the epitome of métis too strictly 
delimits the range and application of métis to non-normative bodies of one sort in a 
limited type of situation. While Dolmage convincingly shows how disabled bodies 
perform métis exemplarily, due to their need to craftily navigate inaccessible 
environments, he does not think about how other bodies might enact entirely different 
strategic movements in environments wherein they face opponents.   
Specifically, what current discourse on métis fails to attend to is how métis is not 
only a function of non-normative bodies that are disenfranchised in their environments, 
but also a complex intelligence cultivated by bodies that are privileged in Eurowestern 
societies. That is, métis is a concept that is particularly productive for characterizing the 
mental and physical grace of athletic bodies in motion, ones that are uniquely embodied 
and powered by a heightened, non-normative awareness of their own forms and 
techniques. This is not an effort to strip disabled bodies of a rare advantage and effective 
mode of navigation that they possess in disabling environments, but rather to demonstrate 
how certain exceptional embodiments are idealized while others are stigmatized even 
though the bodies are performing very similar, elaborate forms of bodily articulation. 
Building upon the features of métis as outlined by Detienne and Vernant, Hawhee, and 
Dolmage, I extend métis’s application to athletic embodiments and mentalities. While I 
use métis to incorporate an amalgamation of features heretofore attributed to the 
concept—namely, corporeality, cunning, and foresight—I see métis less as a cheating or 
deceitful maneuvering than an artful and dedicated cultivation of one’s body in an effort 
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to best oppositional forces. For athletes, this means beating an opponent, and for people 
with disabilities, this means outmaneuvering spaces and situations designed against non-
normative embodiments. Rather than being something conniving, métis is most clearly 
framed in terms of the pillars of Greek speech and action. The métis of athletic bodies is 
not the wide margin of chance and variability to occur within an athletic match (tuche), 
not the sport itself or the equipment used in the sport (techne), nor only the precise timing 
of the athletic body in motion (kairos). The métis of the athletic body is that which so 
thoroughly knows and anticipates these correlative components of the sport, in body and 
mind, and proceeds to deploy this knowledge generatively in the midst of a highly 
volatile, constantly moving, decidedly complicated circumstance. It is an entire way of 
knowing that which is fickle and amorphous, and it is cultivated through a dedicated 
training of one’s body and mind to use particular equipment, traverse inaccessible spaces, 
condition elements of one’s physique and mentality, and do it all innovatively.  
Complex and Extraordinary: Disabled and Athletic Métis  
The athletic métis is an embodied consciousness that can be approached and 
witnessed by many people, but only enacted by particular bodies and minds keenly 
attuned to the dynamics of the sport. Non-athletic bodies and minds have a distinct métis 
that corresponds to non-athletic environments, resources, and protocols; however, none 
so closely aligns with the métis of the athletic body as the métis of the disabled body. 
Disability theorists examine the equipment, environments, and contingent abilities of 
different bodies in varying contexts in a way that closely relates to the questions 
surrounding athletic bodies and abilities. For instance, feminist disability scholar 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson focuses on what she calls the “extraordinary bodies” of 
people with disabilities, figures whose “corporeal otherness” has been marked as 
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“‘monstrosity,’ ‘mutilation,’ ‘deformation,’ ‘crippledness,’ or ‘physical disability’” (5). 
These bodies are rendered extraordinary by virtue of defying able-bodied standards of 
beauty and normalcy. They stand in opposition to what Garland-Thomson calls the 
“normate,” the “constructed identity of those who, by way of the bodily configurations 
and cultural capital they assume, can step into a position of authority and wield the power 
it grants them” because extraordinary bodies remain excluded from the social institutions 
and spaces in which normates establish command (8). Garland-Thomson’s project in 
showing this is to unveil the sociopolitical forces that work to create or exacerbate many 
disabilities in particular contexts and investigate the stereotypes that become attached to 
non-normate bodies.  
In examining how inaccessible contexts render particular bodies marginalized and 
non-ordinary while portraying other bodies as normalized and ordinary, Garland-
Thomson posits that “disability is a representation, a cultural interpretation of physical 
transformation or configuration, and a comparison of bodies that structures social 
relations and institutions” and not an individual, isolated feature of certain bodies (6). 
Rather than being inherently, completely, and always disabled, extraordinary bodies are 
actually ascribed labels of “corporeal deviance—not so much a property of bodies as a 
product of cultural rules about what bodies should be or do” (6). It is “the ways that 
bodies interact with the socially engineered environment and conform to social 
expectations” that renders bodies as normate or not normate (7). Athletic bodies are 
glorified for their ability to extraordinarily navigate certain limits of built environments 
with their speed, agility, or strength and flex their bodies beyond normative extensions, 
whether with athletic equipment or exercise. Bodies deemed disabled are disparaged for 
their extraordinary navigation of spaces with the use of different bodily attributes and 
prosthetics. Garland-Thomson’s work reveals how athletic bodies and disabled bodies, 
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rather than being qualitatively different in what they do, are both extraordinary in their 
non-normative embodiments and movements and coded with cultural appreciation or 
deprecation. Eradicating the “entrenched assumptions that ‘able-bodiedness’ and its 
conceptual opposite, ‘disability,’ are self-evident physical conditions,” Garland-Thomson 
confirms the fact that bodies “acquire the cultural meanings undergirding a hierarchy of 
bodily traits that determines the distribution of privilege, status, and power” (6). The 
able-bodied are not simply able-bodied by virtue of their embodiment, but by the 
environments in which their embodiments are supported. Additionally, the able-bodied 
are not accepted and accommodated only because they are able-bodied, but by social 
beliefs that able-bodiedness is preferable, desirable, and correct. Athletic bodies are 
“legitimated” because of their ostensible transcendance of able-bodied normativity, but, 
like disabled bodies that do not fit able-bodied standards, they are extraordinary bodies 
nonetheless (7). It is only because one is socially accepted and one is denounced in an 
ableist culture that athletes are revered and people with disabilities are rejected. In 
actuality, the extraordinariness of both non-normate groups operates in similar ways: by 
using particular tools or equipment to navigate a limited environment with one’s non-
normative body and bodily attributes. 
Disability theorist Tobin Siebers offers another way to frame the disabled body’s 
non-normative extraordinariness as corporeal and mental complexity. Just as Jay 
Dolmage does when he focuses on the concept of métis in terms of disability, Siebers 
theorizes identity in terms of disability. According to Siebers, the disabled body “opens 
the possibility of classifying identity as an embodied representational category, thereby 
inserting the body into debates about identity politics” (2-3). In a similar way, the athletic 
bodily identity is inextricable from the mind and the body. One of the most important 
implications for this intervention is that it exposes the implicit and widespread “ideology 
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of ability” that undergirds many conceptions of normativity and humanness (8). By 
listing many of its attributes, Siebers defines “the ideology of ability” in its superficial 
assumptions. For example, the ideology of ability claims that “[a]bility is the supreme 
indicator of value when judging human actions, conditions, thoughts, goals, intentions, 
and desires” (10). The able body “has a great capacity for self-transformation,” while the 
disabled body “is limited in what it can do and what it can be trained to do” (10). Because 
of its supposed physical limitations, the disabled body “experiences new situations as 
obstacles,” while the able body enjoys the luxury of being “not really aware of the body” 
because “[o]ne feels the body only when something goes wrong with it” (10). The 
ideology of ability presumes that the able body and mind is less focused on and locked in 
an embodiment because it possesses flexibility and potential for action. Siebers, however, 
upsets the ideology by showing that at the crux of these beliefs is actually a contradiction 
that simultaneously erases the body’s presence (saying that able-bodied people do not 
have a developed awareness of the body) and calls for people to make their bodies’ 
abilities as perfect as possible. The ideology of ability, therefore, creates disability 
through exclusion, and it makes liminal those embodiments and mentalities that make 
explicit the embodiedness of all abilities. The disabled body as well as the athletic body 
are rendered non-normative according to the ideology of ability, despite the fact that one 
is harmfully stigmatized and the other glorified. 
In fact, Siebers’ way of counteracting the ideology of ability connects the 
intricacy of disabled bodies’ movement in inaccessible social contexts to the multifaceted 
movement of athletic bodies in motion. Siebers develops a “theory of complex 
embodiment” that “values disability as a form of human variation” by combining the 
medical and social models of disability (25). He thinks about both the social 
environment’s role in affecting bodily ability as well as the realities of bodily health in 
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even the most accessible of environments to show how the abilities of bodies are 
contingent upon a wide range of variable internal and external factors. The social and 
medical dimensions of embodiment are “reciprocal” and “mutually transformative” in 
their constitution of the body and mind’s experience in any given environment, since the 
body and mind cannot be separated or extracted from the situation, according to the 
theory of complex embodiment (25). This theory of complex embodiment, while 
emerging from a meditation on disabled bodies, extends to the embodiments of athletes in 
sporting contexts as well. Just as the disabled body’s navigation is limited or facilitated 
by social representations, infrastructural constructions, and physical and mental 
conditions outside of social creation, the athletic body is subject to the material realities 
of its playing environment and its physical condition beyond that environment. Although, 
of course, one is constantly and involuntarily subject to an inaccessible world and 
considered lesser in it, while the other is placed in such a context selectively and 
voluntarily and considered better in it.    
The factor that most clearly links disabled and athletic bodies in the theory of 
complex embodiment is the idea that the body, according to Siebers, cannot be 
apprehended as “a garment, vehicle, or burden” because it is nothing short of “a complex 
system that defines our humanity, any knowledge that we might possess, and our 
individual and collective futures” (26). The body, both for people with disabilities and for 
athletes, cannot be ignored because the mind, the very entity used for perception is 
inextricably connected with the body and its mental processes are, in fact, bodily 
processes. Mental and social conceptions of disability and athleticism are generated, 
affected, and composed of bodily configurations and realities. Thus, the theory of 
complex embodiment is especially pivotal in how it can “give disabled people greater 
knowledge of and control over their bodies in situations where increased knowledge and 
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control are possible” (24). It illustrates the fact that embodiment for people with 
disabilities generates a specific mentality and knowledge of a situation that people less 
attuned to or aware of their physicality in any given moment might not have.  In this way, 
Siebers reframes diverse disabilities, like athletic bodies in motion, as involving 
particular “tacit or embodied knowledge[s],” and he even goes so far as to recast 
“disability passing,” the attempt of some people with disabilities to downplay their 
disabilities to “pass” as able-bodied in whatever contexts they can, as “a form of 
embodied knowledge—forced into usage by prejudices against disability—about the 
relationship between the social environment and human ability” (24). Rather than being 
duplicitous “cowards, cheats, [or] con artists,” Siebers sees people with disabilities in 
both their celebration and occasional downplaying of their disabilities as employing métis 
and being “skillful interpreters of the world from whom we all might learn” (24). 
Disabled bodies and minds, rather than being denounced as lesser-abled or functioning in 
a simpler way than so-called able-bodies and minds, are complexly embodied and more 
situationally knowledgeable because of that embodiment. 
Both Mental and Not: String Theory, Tennis, and Métis    
And like the disabled body, the athletic body in motion is, if anything, 
extraordinary and complex. In his tennis essay collection, String Theory, David Foster 
Wallace thoroughly signals just how complex every single motion of the athletic body is, 
especially the well-conditioned motion of the athletic body in full performance. The 
essays convey the idea that the training involved in athletic conditioning and movement 
is a training of body and mind. I will, thus, refer to this body-mind training and 
knowledge in terms of the mover’s united embodimentality. Athletics, to Wallace, are a 
matter of body-mind strength over sheer physical prowess, and it takes an embodimental 
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conditioning to attune oneself to a sport. Wallace’s writings on tennis, tennis 
tournaments, tennis professionals, tennis legends, tennis logistics, tennis equipment, 
tennis courts, tennis etiquette, and personal tennis playing experience demonstrate how 
tennis is an embodimental way of living, thinking, being, and moving through the 
geometric limitations of spacetime. 
The collection’s introduction primes readers for Wallace’s fascination with tennis, 
John Jeremiah Sullivan aptly noting that tennis “may be [Wallace’s] most consistent 
theme at the surface level” because it is “as close as we come to physical chess, or a kind 
of chess in which the mind and body are at one in attacking essentially mathematical 
problems...the perfect game for Wallace” (xi). It is here, in the sacred geometry, 
geometric sacredness, mental physicality, and physical mentality of tennis that Wallace’s 
fascination with tennis really resides. String Theory’s first essay, “Derivative Sport in 
Tornado Alley” echoes this sentiment with Wallace’s recollection of his own junior 
tennis career. In it, Wallace reveals his humble métis not, as may be expected, in his 
writing but in his playing tennis, as he could “think and play octacally” in a sport that 
requires “geometric thinking” (9). The fact that he “found [he] felt best physically 
enwebbed in sharp angles, acute bisections, shaved corners” allows him the physical and 
mental prowess to become “so prescient at using stats, surface, sun, gusts, and a kind of 
stoic cheer that [he] was regarded as a kind of physical savant” in tennis (10, 12). To 
Wallace, tennis requires physical strength and agility, but it even moreso requires “the 
ability to calculate not merely your own angles but the angles of response to your 
angles,” a knowledge of one’s own embodimentality and that embodimentality’s 
movement in relation to moving parts (9). To be competitive in elite levels of play, the 
athletic body in movement must have a knowledge of something exponentially variable 
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and mutating, a métis of a body in flux and an environment in flux. The athletic body 
must have conditioning beyond physical training to succeed in a variable match.  
The work of sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss captures the sort of 
mental and bodily knowledge that Wallace writes about in this essay and in subsequent 
tennis writings. Derived from his ethnographic observations and sociological explorations 
into the ways in which various societies from different eras and locations teach bodily 
movement traditions, Mauss’s “Techniques of the Body” tracks and categorizes the 
“physio-psycho-sociological assemblages of series of actions” in a given context, or “the 
ways in which from society to society men know how to use their bodies” (70). Mauss’s 
concept of “bodily techniques” offers a productive framework for thinking about the 
body in motion as an assemblage of bodily techniques, learned and socialized processes 
of moving the body in particular ways for particular outcomes or activities—whether they 
be involuntary movements (like breathing), voluntary movements that are contingent 
upon certain embodied abilities (like walking), or extensions of simpler and more 
frequent movements (like sporting activities). Wallace’s essays exhibit these bodily 
techniques that are not only physical, not only mental, but conditioned contextually, with 
embodimental memory and execution. Athletic métis provides Wallace with an advantage 
over players physically stronger, but not embodimentally stronger, than he is. Known as 
“Slug” by his teammates because of his relative indolence, Wallace did not possess the 
same determination or effort in training as his “bigger, faster, more coordinated, and 
better-coached opponents”; yet, he was able to win against them because of his “cautious 
automatism” in tricky weather and playing conditions that allowed him to analyze the 
situation embodimentally (“Derivative Sport” 10). 
More to Mauss’s point, Wallace trains his holistic embodimentality in preparation 
for his matches rather than running drills mindlessly. Mauss argues that these bodily 
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techniques in all expressions are predicated upon learned techniques of movement and 
repetitions of those movements. Unlike purely physical training, though, Mauss’s idea of 
training bodily techniques involves “technical education” and “apprenticeship” in 
situations that one must maneuver psychologically and emotionally, as well as physically 
(71-72). Following this same understanding, Wallace does not rely on physical 
conditioning, muscle memory, and endurance alone in conditions that would not facilitate 
their fullest expression. During matches in which he is a clear underdog, Wallace 
employed a kind of “verve” and “imagination” in being able to “expand [his] logistical 
territory to countenance the devastating effect a 15- to 30-mph stutter-breeze swirling 
southwest to east would have on [his] best calculations as to how ambitiously to respond 
to Joe Perfectchair’s topspin drive into [his] backhand corner” (“Derivative Sport” 11). 
Wallace wins many matches because of his foresight and embodied sense of his very 
involved environment that allows him to adapt to his opponent, his resources, and the 
match conditions. 
Wallace’s complex embodimental awareness enacts the sort of bodily techniques 
that Mauss describes. To characterize bodily techniques further, Mauss brings what he 
deems the tripartite—physical, psychical, and sociological—“habitus” of the body to the 
forefront and explains, 
These habits do not just vary with individuals and their imitations, they vary 
especially between societies, educations, properties and fashions, prestiges. In 
them we should see the techniques and work of collective and individual practical 
reason rather than, in the ordinary way, merely the soul and its repetitive 
faculties...it [is] not possible to have a clear idea of all these facts about running, 
swimming, etc., unless one introduced a triple consideration instead of a single 
consideration, be it mechanical and physical, like an anatomical and physiological 
theory of walking...It is the triple viewpoint, that of the “total man” that is needed. 
(73) 
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In his description of his own embodimentality in action, David Foster Wallace shows his 
tennis skill to be a concrete example of Mauss’s tripartite habitus. To Mauss, any 
physical action is a “gymnic art perfected in its own day,” contingent upon the situational 
assembly of technical and societal education, and the “concourse of the body and moral 
or intellectual symbols” (71, 76). The sociological and physical conditioning of the body, 
produces movements that are physio-psycho-sociological bodily techniques rather than 
only physical movements. Following this same idea, instead of coming into the game 
with his physical skillset solidified, Wallace generates an embodimental skillset and 
movement practice given the pressures of the unique circumstance. Throughout his play 
in the “Illinois combination of pocked courts, sickening damp, and wind,” he learns that 
the “wind required and rewarded an almost Zen-like acceptance of things as they actually 
were, on-court” and deploys a métis that anticipates the fluctuation of things as uncertain 
as the blowing of the wind (“Derivative Sport” 11). Fittingly, then, it is when these 
variations were lessened by more elaborate stadiums and court materials that Wallace 
became less competitive. “Without deformities to play around,” Wallace lost his “inner 
boundary, [his] own personal set of lines” and was “disabled because [he] was unable to 
accommodate the absence of disabilities to accommodate” (16). With the installation of 
arenas and equipment that cater exclusively to physical strength, Wallace lost his 
counterintuitive advantage of being less physically dominant in an unsophisticated venue. 
The proceeding essays in String Theory extend Mauss’s foundation of the 
embodimental physio-psycho-sociological training to professional tennis players. Moving 
beyond his own métis, Wallace turns to the métis that constitutes elite athletic greatness 
in “How Tracy Austin Broke My Heart.” By combining both the trained skill and 
discipline of his teammates and opponents as well as the embodimental acuity of his in-
game knowledge, Wallace arrives at a description of legendary athletes. In this 
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description, his essay moves from displaying only Maussian tripartite bodily techniques 
to explaining the embodimental métis of athletic bodies in motion. Thus, he activates the 
rhetorical discourse of métis, particularly that of Debra Hawhee’s Bodily Arts. Just as 
Mauss thinks about the physio-psycho-sociological training of bodies, Hawhee thinks 
about métis in terms of bodily techniques, “a consideration of ancient bodies and bodily 
arts that would examine the way identity and value circulate through particular bodies as 
they practice and perform various arts" (4). Like Mauss’s idea of physio-psycho-
sociological bodily techniques, Hawhee’s idea of bodily arts is an embodimental bodily 
artistry predicated upon the Greek concept of hexis, “a readable disposition and manner, a 
bodily comportment...bound up with the more abstract ancient notion of aretē, or 
virtuosity” (4-6). Wallace’s interpretation of tennis stars engender this virtuosity 
wholeheartedly. Describing Tracy Austin, Wallace remarks, “Great athletes are 
profundity in motion. They enable abstractions like power and grace and control to 
become not only incarnate but televisable” (26). For Wallace, world class tennis requires 
“extraordinary mental powers” of “geniuses-in-motion,” a métis that anticipates 
opponents’ movements before and during one’s own skillful, strategic motion (37). Elite 
tennis players take physio-psycho-sociological bodily techniques into embodimental 
métis by mobilizing their body-mind awareness and virtuous dispositions. 
More specifically, as Mauss and Hawhee theorize and Wallace affirms, the best 
athletes perform embodimental brilliance without conscious rationalization of their every 
movement. Mauss defines his concept of “dexterity” through “people with a sense of all 
their well co-ordinated movements to a goal, who are practised, who ‘know what they are 
up to’” without constantly making logical, or purely mental, decision to have a grasp on 
what they are doing (78). “Craft” or “Cleverness,” to Mauss, involves a “presence of 
mind and habit combined” that distinguishes athletic movement from the realm of pure 
 18 
physicality or pure mentality and represents it as a non-rational embodimental process 
(78). Wallace’s take on athletic embodimentality emphasizes its nature as both mental 
and not. A top athlete can “make a certain type of genius as carnally discernible as it ever 
can get,” even though, as his main argument in the Tracy Austin essay states, they may 
not be able to verbally convey this genius (28). In fact, as Wallace concludes, therein lies 
the genius to the great athletes’ game—a knowledge so mentally embodied that the 
logical mind seems not to be present during the articulation of métis in athletic 
movement. As Wallace divulges, “[t]he real, many-veiled answer to the question of just 
what goes through a great player’s mind as he stands at the center of hostile crowd-noise 
and lines up the free-throw that will decide the game might well be: nothing at all” (38). 
The knowledge of the sport and the movement is so deeply embodimental that athletes do 
not rationally calculate every hit, stroke, or action. It is certainly not a lack of knowledge 
that prevents these athletes from speaking to their skill or experiences in games, as 
Wallace challenges “[a]nyone who buys the idea that great athletes are dim should have a 
close look at an NFL playbook, or at a basketball coach’s diagram of a 3-2 zone trap,” 
but it is rather a nonverbal, embodimental knowledge that expresses its genius through 
motion (37). It is only when athletes can “[c]ease to be wholly present in [their] wills and 
choice and movements,” only when they can, “in performance, be totally present: they 
can proceed on instinct and muscle-memory and autonomic will such that agent and 
action are one,” that a skilled athlete operates with an embodimental métis (37-38). The 
athletic embodimentality, in both rigid training and endless physical conditioning, is a 
non-rationally intellectual, emotional knowledge-base and an affective register for 
embodied and abstract artistry. 
The athletic embodimentality that produces a non-logical corporeal knowledge, 
however, does not take only one form. As Wallace’s essay on other tennis professionals 
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reveal, métis takes many different embodimental forms and adapts to many different 
situations. Similarly, Hawhee’s idea of métis involves the thorough mastery of one’s 
particular physio-psycho-sociological bodily techniques to produce aesthetic spectacles 
or impressive efficiency of the body at work. Adding to Mauss’s idea of merely having 
bodily techniques that reveal deeper things about one’s self, Hawhee’s notion of métis 
transfers having bodily techniques to doing bodily techniques. The key turn here is that, 
while métis involves hexis, or bodily techniques that are “indistinguishable from habits 
and practices,” it also incorporates it (58). Métis is that which “cultivates multiple hexeis, 
that have the capacity for changing in response to particular situations,” and that 
distinction of being able to change “makes all the difference” (58). Because it is ever-
changing, métis is not contingent upon a determined embodiment, type of body, or 
particular hexis, and, instead, it involves the bodily doings and fluid assemblages of 
hexeis as agile embodimentalities. Rather than achieving a certain type of body or 
conditioning the body to achieve efficiency in one set way with one particular type of 
embodiment, métis entails adroitly engaging your particular embodimentality to be 
hyperaware of its doings and sensitive to its complex workings during any given 
movement.  
In the third and final essays of String Theory, which concentrate on the 
athleticism of Michael Joyce and Roger Federer respectively, Wallace confirms 
Hawhee’s notion that métis does not require one standard physical body or one type of 
physical expression. In fact, he challenges the very notion that métis is something 
physical, permanently achievable, or unchanging. For Joyce, Wallace shows that the 
strictly physical is not enough to contend with the métis of the best players. For Federer, 
who is one of the best players, Wallace shows that it is not in having a normative athletic 
body that grants him métis; rather, it is in having flexibility in one’s embodimentality that 
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fashions métis. When watching Joyce, Wallace remarks on the skill of his game that 
necessitates “body control, hand-eye coordination, quickness, flat-out speed, endurance, 
and that strange mix of caution and abandon we call courage” but also a sort of bodily 
“smarts” that anticipates “the tree of variables and determinants” in space and time that 
spawns from every shot (“Michael Joyce” 65). With his observation of Roger Federer, 
Wallace highlights the métis of his “kinetic beauty,” or what he describes as “human 
beings’ reconciliation with the fact of having a body,” and his exercising of his aesthetic 
bodily recognition and intelligence on the court (“Roger Federer” 119). According to 
Wallace, Federer is “a creature whose body is both flesh and, somehow, light,” who 
operates on the “muscular and neurological…‘kinesthetic sense,’ meaning the ability to 
control the body and its artificial extensions through complex and very quick systems of 
tasks” (128, 130-131). Through the juxtaposition of what he profiles in Michael Joyce’s 
game and subsequently in Roger Federer’s game, David Foster Wallace shows the 
difference between good players with physical prowess and truly great tennis players 
with métis. The player with métis is embodimentally refined and marked by his aptitude 
for changeability, while the player without is skilled at routine physical tasks. Joyce is 
physically advanced and bodily-dependent, while Federer is something entirely 
transcendent of physical strength with his embodimental knowledge and its “artificial 
extensions.” 
When further describing Michael Joyce and tennis players of his caliber, that is, 
professional players in the top tier of the game but who are not ranked quite high enough 
to be internationally renowned, Wallace expounds mainly upon the physicality of the 
game. He details the gritty realities of playing tennis, the bodily functions and exertions 
of effort, in addition to the physical measurements and characteristics of the players. 
Furthermore, he inventories and reviews the material aspects of the equipment and 
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surfaces of the sport, like the racket technology, the composition and outline of the court, 
and the placement of the players on the court depending on different styles of play. When 
observing these tennis professionals, Wallace claims that there are “a million little ways 
you can tell that somebody’s a great player,” and they are all attributes of bodily 
comportment: “details in his posture, in the way he bounces the ball with his racket-head 
to pick it up, in the casual way he twirls the racket while waiting for the ball” (“Michael 
Joyce” 53). He even delves into the “pros’ tics,” the “little extraneous tics, stylistic 
fingerprints” that all skilled players have “because of years of repetition and ingraining” 
(62). He dissects the nuances between different players’ grips, footing, and strokes and 
explores the tremendous impact these miniscule physical adjustments can make, but 
ultimately considers the physically great players to fall short of tennis mastery and métis. 
Michael Joyce, according to Wallace and his own coach, “doesn’t ‘see’ the ball in the 
same magical way that Andre Agassi [a top tennis legend] does,” and, therefore, does not 
play the ball in the same magical way that a player whose “vision is literally one in a 
billion” does (64-65). Although he has somewhat achieved the sort of “radical 
compression of his attention and self” that it takes to “become a transcendent practitioner 
of an art,” he does not quite possess the “vision and timing” of métis that complements 
and completes the most elite athletes (81). He is, in many cases, a tennis star; yet, his skill 
is limited by its enormous amount of physical strength and stamina that overshadows an 
embodimental focus on the pacing and finesse of the game. 
Roger Federer, in contrast, stands as the quintessence of métis, an athletic 
embodimentality that extends far beyond physical dexterity. Comparing the titles of the 
essays alone reveals a discrepancy between the ways that Wallace views the two 
players—“Tennis Player Michael Joyce’s Professional Artistry as a Paradigm of Certain 
Stuff about Choice, Freedom, Limitation, Joy, Grotesquerie, and Human Completeness” 
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versus “Federer Both Flesh and Not.” From the way that the players are presented in 
them, Joyce has a “professional artistry” that is complete in humanness, or that which is 
physical and bound by spatiotemporal issues of “freedom,” “choice,” and “limitation.” 
On the contrary, Federer exceeds the parameters of physicality and is something 
embodimentally beyond, as he is both physical flesh “and not.” Instead of investigating 
the physical and material components of Federer’s game, in the way that he did Joyce’s, 
Wallace essay on Federer is “about a spectator’s experience of Federer” and observing 
what he calls “Federer Moments” that incite bodily reactions from their viewers like 
dropped jaws and expanded eyes (“Both Flesh and Not” 119, 117). Federer, unlike Joyce, 
“is able to see, or create, gaps and angles for winners that no one else can envision” and 
has a foresight that allows him to orchestrate “spectacular-looking angles and winners” 
many shots ahead of their execution (125). Beyond having a physicality trained for tennis 
movement and practiced in athleticism, Federer engenders the embodimental 
understanding of how to deploy those movements in a game. His training is “both 
muscular and neurological. Hitting thousands of strokes, day after day, develops the 
ability to do by ‘feel’ what cannot be done by regular conscious thought,” thus it is métis 
that enables Federer an embodimental prowess on the court that far exceeds the ability of 
even the strongest or most able-bodied player in the game (131). Federer, to Wallace, has 
an exemplary tennis métis, a player with the physicality and embodimentality to 
capitalize on such physicality. As he puts it, 
Roger Federer is a first-rate, kick-ass power-baseliner. It’s just that that’s not all 
he is. There’s also his intelligence, his occult anticipation, his court sense, his 
ability to read and manipulate opponents, to mix spins and speeds to misdirect and 
disguise, to use tactical foresight and peripheral vision and kinesthetic range 
instead of just rote pace—all this has exposed the limits, and possibilities, of 
men’s tennis as it’s not played...Roger Federer is showing that the speed and 
strength of today’s pro game are merely its skeleton, not its flesh. He has, 
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figuratively and literally, re-embodied men’s tennis, and for the first time in years 
the game’s future is unpredictable. (137-138) 
In this formulation, Federer has “re-embodied” tennis as something exceeding the 
physical senses, skills, and structure of the body as something somatic. Beyond mere 
physical body and mere mental knowledge, Federer is a transcendent player with a 
profoundly athletic embodimentality. Throughout every essay, and especially his 
discourse on Roger Federer, Wallace remains engrossed in the idea of métis in the art of 
tennis athleticism and the bodily knowledge and emotion that it reveals. 
While he might not be the strongest, fastest, smartest, or most traditionally able-
bodied body, Federer’s demonstrably supreme embodimentality speaks to the power of 
métis to traverse set parameters and physical limitations. In terms reminiscent of Garland-
Thomson’s idea of “extraordinary bodies,” Wallace describes Roger Federer as “one of 
those rare, preternatural athletes who appear to be exempt, at least in part, from physical 
laws,” a “genius, or mutant, or avatar,” a “creature whose body is both flesh and, 
somehow, light” (“Both Flesh and Not” 127-128). It is not an overcoming of his 
extraordinary embodimentality to achieve great physical feats, but rather a particular 
orchestration of his physiomental movements and knowledge that allows him to dominate 
in an environment in which he is not physically dominant in terms of muscle, speed, or 
stamina. Save for a few components of the sport, tennis and many sports are not a matter 
of sheer able-bodied superiority; they are “a matter not of strength but of timing” and of 
embodimental conditioning beyond muscle building (“Michael Joyce” 64). Just as the 
rhetorical conceptions of métis, as presented by Jay Dolmage and Debra Hawhee, showed 
disabled Greek gods to cross environments that exclude them and best opponents that 
were more “able-bodied” than they were in areas of speed and strength, David Foster 
Wallace shows elite athletes to beat more physically able opponents with a masterful 
embodimentality, or métis. 
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In his tennis essays, David Foster Wallace demonstrates the way that Marcel 
Mauss and Debra Hawhee frame the movements of the body and athletic techniques as 
multifaceted bodily techniques that have been conditioned from excessive training and 
cultural exposure. Like Mauss’s work on bodily techniques generated from physical, 
cultural, emotional, and motional practices, Wallace’s essays on tennis exemplify the 
inextricability of the body-mind and his belief that all writing and movement is a “co”-
compositional expression of these parts. In thinking about sports experiences in terms of 
body-minds in motion, Wallace contemplates and recounts the routine, disciplining, and 
exercises of the moving bodies in nonfictional and fictional accounts of others’ and his 
own tennis training. And, like Hawhee’s work on embodimentality in motion, Wallace’s 
work shows the métis of moving athletic embodimentalities. This is even true for the 
collection’s fourth essay, which strays from its focus on “Democracy and Commerce at 
the U.S. Open” to consider the “special kind of emotional flexibility” needed to 
supplement the physical endurance of tournament participants (102). It is in this 
enthrallment with emotional flexibility that Wallace’s most illuminating insights on the 
thinking, feeling athletic body surface and radiate. For this reason, String Theory offers 
an insightful exposition of métis. Throughout String Theory, Wallace offers incredible 
depictions of tennis stars’ embodied feelings and movements and, thus, exemplifies the 
power of the cleverly thinking athletic body in the rigidly bounded and isolating game of 
tennis. 
Infinitely Majestic Play: Infinite Jest, Tennis, Disability, and Métis   
David Foster Wallace more fully portrays manifestations of métis in tennis 
players in his 2006 novel, Infinite Jest, with elite junior tennis players at Enfield Tennis 
Academy (E.T.A.). Its attendees are not only physically superior, but intellectually 
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proficient student-athletes. One of these student-athletes and a central character of the 
novel, seventeen-year-old Hal Incandenza, demonstrates an athletic métis similar to the 
tennis professionals detailed in String Theory. The novel takes place in a near future time 
where years have become subsidized by major corporations and, in the Year of the 
Depend Adult Undergarment, Hal’s tennis career takes him from a national ranking of 
number 43 to number four (Infinite Jest 259-260). Not changing in physical stature nor 
mental aptitude, Hal’s “delicate...spinny, rather cerebral game hasn’t altered,” but it has 
“grown a beak” (260). More specifically, he has changed his embodimental posture to the 
game, as Hal is “[n]o longer fragile or abstracted-looking on court, he seems now almost 
to hit the corners without thinking about it” (260). This game and this suspended rational 
consciousness in favor of a more embodied knowledge base lead him to newfound 
victory. Since he cannot beat someone aggressively and forcefully, relying on mere 
physicality alone, and because tennis requires embodied movement that prevents it from 
being a strictly mental battle, Hal’s tactical game is one that configures his mental and 
physical skills discerningly. His game is one of “attrition” in which “he’ll probe, pecking, 
until some angle opens up. Until then he’ll probe. He’d rather run his man ragged, wear 
him down” rather than combat him using their respective physical arsenals only (260). By 
switching his game from getting defeated by stronger opponents in physical competitions 
and self-defeating by getting caught up in his head, Hal refines an athletic métis that 
enables him to move up the tennis rankings.  
A similar trajectory exists for Ted Schacht, an E.T.A. student with Crohn’s 
Disease and a knee injury that has taken him out of serious contention for the highest 
ranking, whose “tennis seems to have improved...since he stopped really caring” about 
winning, thinking that he cannot (266). “It’s like his hard flat game stopped having any 
purpose beyond itself and started feeding on itself and got fuller, looser, its edges less 
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jagged,” once he could not rely on his physical strength alone and needed to position his 
body and mind more strategically in matches (266). Schacht begins to echo the idea that 
“[c]ompetitive tennis is largely mental, once you’re at a certain plateau of skill and 
conditioning” because it takes a knowledge of the body and its navigation through space 
to orchestrate effective shots and returns (269). Thinking about tennis as a physically-
informed mentality that works best without conscious rationalization of every move 
instead of as something to physically dominate urges Hal and Schacht to perform not 
only physically and not only mentally, but with an embodimental métis. Aside from those 
who have recently cultivated forms of métis, the best tennis player at E.T.A., John “No 
Relation” Wayne, has possessed a similar sort of finely polished tennis métis since 
childhood that makes him so dominant. With his game “[t]here’s surprisingly little 
thought” and an “automatic beauty” to the way he travels the court and preempts his 
opponents’ strokes (260). Wallace depicts John Wayne’s movement as something 
graceful and natural, like “post-pirouette backward inertia,” and his emotions as 
“emerg[ing] in terms of velocity” (261, 263). His mastery of the sport clearly comes from 
a fusion of body and mind, in which his physical movements are measured in terms of 
virtuosity and his emotional feelings are presented in terms of their spatiality. Without an 
intertwined coalescence of body and mind into a cunning embodimentality, E.T.A. 
students cannot compete with the most elite players, regardless of how intelligent or 
strong they are. It is upon developing and enacting a tennis métis that they 
embodimentally grasp the contours of the game and can maneuver its confines using the 
resources and skills that they have.   
What is even more interesting about Infinite Jest’s exploration of métis, however, 
is how Wallace also locates métis beyond tennis and in the embodimentalities of 
characters with physical and mental disabilities. One of the novel’s major plot threads 
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follows Les Assassins des Fauteuils Rollents/The Wheelchair Assassins (A.F.R.), a 
Québécois terrorist group, in their convoluted and strategic efforts to secure the original 
copy of a mind-consuming film, “Infinite Jest,” to use against United States citizens. 
Even though they are named for their disabilities and villainized throughout the novel for 
their insidious political agenda, Wallace shows how even their violent origins and plots 
possess métis. Like the exemplars of métis with disabilities that Hawhee and Dolmage 
discuss, the A.F.R.’s offensive strikes “must not be direct” and are stopped only in the 
face of “tall and steep hillsides” that they cannot circumvent by means of 
outmaneuvering environmental obstacles (Infinite Jest 845). As readers learn from E.T.A. 
student James Struck’s research on the subject, the “legless Quebecker Wheelchair 
Assassins, although legless and confined to wheelchairs, nevertheless contrive to have 
situated large reflective devices across odd-numbered United States highways for the 
purpose of disorienting and endangering northbound Americans” (1056 n304). A.F.R. not 
only can mobilize widespread political agendas, but they use their particular 
embodimental insight to dismantle the infrastructure by which able-bodied citizens more 
easily and mindlessly travel by messing with the U.S. highways and interfering with 
pipelines and waste management across the country (1056 n304). In addition, in A.F.R.’s 
brutal attacks on Canadian officials who refuse to yield to their demands, they are 
“masters of stealth...affording no warning excepting the ominous squeak of slow wheels, 
striking swiftly and without warning” (1056 n304). And this calculation and secrecy 
makes them “more difficult for responsible authorities to anticipate, control, interdict, or 
reason with than even the most passionate U.S. kabals” (1056 n304). The A.F.R.’s 
intelligence is expertly deployed and not able to be comprehended logically, since it is an 
embodimental understanding that allows them to assess situations flexibly and enact their 
plans accordingly. 
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Beyond their current agenda, the A.F.R. group identity originates in a game of 
great chance, risk, and métis—a ceremony of embodied movement that comes to define 
their status, physicality, and embodimental awareness. Their group rituals, as Struck 
reads, are “intimately bound up with ‘Les jeux pour-memes,’ formal competitive games 
whose end is less any sort of ‘prize’ than it is a manner of basic identity: i.e., that is, 
‘game’ as metaphysical environment and psychohistorical locus and gestalt” and, thus, 
require a holistic, embodied knowledge base to play them expertly (1058 n304). More 
specifically, their central competition, “La Culte du Prochain Train”/ “The Cult of the 
Next Train,” involves a game of mental quickness, careful timing, and embodimental 
awareness of one’s body in relation to other moving bodies. 
‘Le Jeu du Prochaine Train itself is simplicity in motion. The object: Be the last of 
your round’s six to jump from one side of the tracks to the other——that is, 
across the tracks——before the train passes. Your only real opponents are your 
six’s other five. Never is the train itself regarded as an opponent. The speeding, 
screaming train is regarded rather as le jeu’s boundary, arena, and reason. Its size, 
its speed down the extremely gradual north-to south grade of what was then 
southwestern Quebec, and the precise mechanical specifications of each schedule 
train——these are known to the directeurs, they comprise the constants in a game 
the variables of which are the respective wills of the six ranged along the track, 
and their estimates of which are the respective wills of the six ranged along the 
track, and their estimates of one another’s will to risk all to win.’ (1059 n304) 
It is a game not unlike tennis in its strict geometric proportions, individual opposition to a 
variety of fickle and antagonistic forces, and necessary physical and mental keenness of 
one’s footing and timing. Furthermore, it is a game only mastered by the “nerveless and 
self-contained virtuosi” who “frequently close their eyes entirely as they wait, trusting the 
railroad ties’ vibration and the whistle’s pitch, as well as intuition, and fate, and whatever 
numinous influences lie just beyond fate”; in other words, the players must develop an 
embodimental knowledge, one that supplements basic empirical evidence and physical 
positioning with a deeper attunement to one’s environment and the fluidity of the game 
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(1060 n304). While having a less refined sense of métis in this game and misreading the 
situation can result in severe physical injuries and death, it also can lead to a player 
cultivating métis as a Wheelchair Assassin. Either way, métis here is inextricably tied to 
the A.F.R., disabled bodies, and their cunning escapades. 
The conflation of athleticism, disability, and métis in the novel also appears in a 
more direct way during a short vignette on blindness and tennis conditioning. Idris 
Arslanian, a young E.T.A. student being used as the tennis coaches’ guinea pig, is 
stranded outside the school’s weight room, blindfolded, desperately fumbling around 
trying to find a bathroom. When Schacht runs into him, Idris explains that the blindfold is 
part of a training experiment that E.T.A.’s Coach Thorp is mandating, to emulate 
Dymphna, an even younger, but prodigious, tennis player with a visual impairment slated 
to attend E.T.A. the following year. At nine years old, Dymphna is top-ranked for all 
players up to twelve years old, and Coach Thorp believes that “the highness of the 
ranking may be due to the blindness itself” (568). Schacht discredits his high-ranking as 
being “real high-ranked” only “for a blind, soft-skilled kid,” but the coaches identify 
something different about Dymphna’s game (568). Idris relays the difference as being in 
Dymphna’s “anticipation,” an “excellence in anticipation in the blind because of hearing 
and sounds, because sounds are merely…‘Variations in Intensity’” and he can “judge the 
opponent player’s VAPS [Vector/Angle/Pace/Spin] in more detail by the ear than the 
eye” (568, 1044 n236). Supposedly, “[t]his is explaining why the highly ranked 
Dymphna appears to always have floated by magic to the necessary spot where a ball is 
soon to land,” when, in actuality, that ability is not a simple equation of senses, as if 
tennis plus hearing minus sight equals athletic acuity (568). In fact, the idea that 
Dymphna is able to play prodigiously by the amplification of somatic sense alone is 
shown to be downright comical. Allegedly, Dymphna is able to “judge the necessary spot 
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of landing by the intensity of the sound of the ball against the opponent’s string,” or by 
only physical means (568). But, when Idris attempts to play tennis by ear, he “frequently 
faced the wrong direction for play” and “frequently judged by the intensity of balls struck 
on adjacent courts and ran onto adjacent courts, intruding on play,” thus wildly failing at 
playing tennis without his sight (568). The problem here, of course, is that Dymphna does 
not rely on particular physical features alone, but the embodimentality trained by virtue 
of having particular physical or mental capacities. It is not only the particular 
combination of physical features that defines Dymphna, but the shrewd implementation 
of his knowledge from physical training and navigation with particular physical resources 
that generates a distinctive métis. Not unlike John Wayne, Dymphna does not use only 
physical senses or objects to have an elevated sense of awareness on the court, nor does 
he use entirely non-physical reasoning through the matches. Instead, he uses the 
embodimentality he has to assess, feel, and comprehend the space physiomentally, to 
know where shots will land and how to return them effectively. The athletic body and the 
disabled body, in this episode, are likened in their extraordinariness and métis. 
Emily Russell draws a similar conclusion between the ways that athletic bodies 
and disabled bodies are both extraordinary in the text, while conventionally being framed 
as more-than-ordinary and less-than ordinary, respectively. Russell picks up on disability 
theorist Lennard Davis’s idea that the bodies that are considered the “norm” have actually 
become “ideal” and “by definition, can never be found in the world” due to their 
fallacious position as “something that is not only attainable, but already widely attained” 
(qtd. in Davis 25). These ostensibly “normal” bodies, like athletic bodies, are really 
falsely ideal bodies that create so-called disability by contrast. Russell deconstructs this 
false binary between normal and abnormal bodies and argues that the disabled and 
athletic characters in Infinite Jest are notably similar in their make-ups. In addition to 
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disabled characters like the A.F.R., the gargantuan infants, the “Union of the Hideously 
and Improbably Deformed,” the athletes in the novel “offer a visual representation of the 
broader phenomenon of corporeal assemblage” (147, 150). The athletes do not constitute 
a fantasized wholeness and unified strength, but they are fragmented in a way that is 
typically only attributed to bodies and minds with disabilities. With asymmetric limbs 
and morphing forms, the athletic bodies in Wallace’s novel demonstrate the fact that all 
physical capacity and form, regardless of how able and enduring it may seem, are 
“fleeting” and constructed, not natural and infinite (150). To Russell, while athletic 
bodies are supposedly “superabled,” their “relentless conditioning results in hypertrophy, 
joint disorders, exaggerated appetites, and exhaustion...blur[s] the line between abled, 
disabled, and superabled, reminding us that these division are flexible and not naturally 
determined” (148).  
What this does not factor in, though, is the idea that athletic bodies, even without 
evident bodily anomaly, extreme physical difference, or grotesquely hypertrophied parts, 
can be akin to disabled bodies in the way they move about their limited spheres. Whereas 
Russell takes these extraordinary bodies as metaphor, claiming that Wallace uses them as 
hosts for a larger point about the disjointed experience of reading the novel itself, a focus 
on métis shows the literal importance of considering athletic and disabled bodies as 
similarly extraordinary, but coded entirely differently in cultural estimations of them. The 
connection between E.T.A.’s tennis stars and the disabled characters in the novel is an 
embodimental one. The correspondence is not one that holds only when athletes are 
construed as misshapen, and it is not one that takes the movement of disabled bodies as 
figurative. Wallace proves that athletic and disabled embodimentalities in their very 
movements are kindred. Beyond narratively stating that these bodies have similar 
constructions, Infinite Jest makes explicit athletic and disabled bodies’ shared reliance on 
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particular embodimental métis, even if the two groups have entirely different physical 
and mental looks and functions.  
Conclusions     
Above all, David Foster Wallace’s dedicated portrayals of athletic 
embodimentalities in motion confirms the complexity and extraordinariness of those 
forms. He concurrently underscores how athletic embodimentalities are conditioned and 
contingent modes of navigation like the movement of all complex, extraordinary 
embodiments, especially those with disabilities. Although these embodied practices 
concentrate in non-normative and disabled bodies and abilities and proceed to put them in 
conversation with ideals of flawlessness, grace, and embodimentality, métis is not a 
contradictory idea or one that can only extend to normate bodies. In fact, métis, by 
definition, refuses to consider any physical form as ideal in and of itself, and it does not 
require that a body can perform any particular abilities for its instantiation. Moreover, 
métis frames prosthetic bodily extensions as resourceful and dexterous, whether in the 
form of material objects or other people; likewise, it casts unconventional bodily 
movements and features that frequently render certain bodies “disabled”—whether it be a 
mobility, cognitive, or sensory impairment—as some of the many diverse forms of being 
and doing in the world. After all, as Dolmage explains, métis is “the craft of forging 
something practical out of these possibilities” and “changing the world as we move 
through it,” no matter how it is that we do so (149). Certainly some bodies and ways of 
moving and thinking are accommodated, privileged, and even revered in the case of elite 
athletes, but what David Foster Wallace’s writing of these idealized bodies can show is 
that they are really exercising métis of their particular embodimentalities. Athletic bodies 
are not just really good bodies to be emulated and fetishized, and disabled bodies are not 
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bad bodies to be pitied and diminished. Both athletic and disabled bodies are infinitely 
majestic in their métis, and it is a matter of representation that falsely and qualitatively 
differentiates their embodimentalities. 
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